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Abstract
A recent draft by Victor Haghani and Richard Dewey [1] describes an experiment where
participants were given initial wealth, a coin of known bias, and could bet a (variable) proportion
of their in-game wealth on a sequence of flips of this coin. Assuming log utility and uncapped
reward, the optimal strategy is to bet as per the Kelly criterion. Interestingly, the participants in
general did not do so - many bet a larger proportion, up to 100% of their game assets. This note
shows that such behaviour can be rational, if one takes into account the effect of extraneous wealth.
The optimal solution for log utility with extraneous wealth is found, and extended to the optimal
solution for a wide class of utility functions. A counterintuitive result is proved : for any
continuous, concave, differentiable utility function, the optimal choice at every point depends only
on the probability of reaching that point. That is, the optimal choice depends only on the number of
heads encountered, regardless of the sequence. Lastly, the practical calculation of the optimal bet at
every stage is made possible through use of the binomial expansion, reducing the problem size from
exponential to quadratic. This makes the solution practical for games with many hundreds of steps.
The author thanks Vlad Ragulin1, for introducing the original problem, and Andy Morton2 for
motivating investigation of the general case and economic interpretation of the results.
1[Director, US Govt Bond Trading, CGML]
2[Global Head G10 Rates, Markets Treasury and Finance, CGML]
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1 Setup
The player is given 1 unit of game wealth, and the chance to bet on f flips of a biased coin coin with
known probability p > 0.5 of coming up heads. At every flip, the player may bet a proportion b ∈ (0, 1)
of their current game wealth g on heads. The player also has extraneous wealth w, which is not affected
by the betting.
We initially assume the player’s internal reward function is log utility, i.e. they aim to maximise
E[Log(gfinal + w)] where gfinal is their final game wealth. If optimizing only one step ahead, the opti-
mal bet = (2p− 1)(1 + wg ) , which reduces to the Kelly betting criterion (2p− 1) if w = 0.
Interestingly, this is not optimal for an n-step game. As one would expect, as g À w, the game
wealth dominates and the optimal bet converges to (2p−1). If g ¿ w , and the game is due to end soon,
the optimal bet is 1.00, which agrees with the intuition that there is little downside to betting the entire
tiny stake.
But for moderately long games, the risk of losing paths that could lead to large wealth implies that
the first bet must be lower than 1. For example, if p = 0.6 and w = 1000, for 25 flips the optimal first
bet is approximately 0.659.
2 Convenient notation
The possible paths of the game form a complete binary tree. We number the nodes of this tree with the
root = 1.
Node n has children Node 2n (if the coin gives heads) and Node 2n + 1(if the coin gives tails).
For f flips, the final level (that is, level f + 1) has 2f nodes. Let
gn = the game wealth at node n
bn = the bet at node n
pn = the probability of reaching node n
(1)
Figure 1: 2-flip game, p = 0.6, player bets according to the Kelly criterion
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Node n belongs to level bLog2(n)c+1 , that is Floor[Log2(n)+1]. At level m, pk may take m+1 distinct
values, corresponding to the m + 1 possibilities 0, 1, ..., m of the number of heads in m flips.Evidently
gn ≥ 0 for all n. Also g2n = gn(1+bn) and g2n+1 = gn(1-bn) .This gives us the following recurrences:
gn =
g2n+g2n+1
2
bn =
g2n−g2n+1
g2n+g2n+1
(2)
This is useful : if we know the final game wealths, we know for free all previous bets and wealths.
3 Analytic optimal solution for log utility & extraneous wealth
Since g1 = 1 and by (2) , the unweighted sum of wealths at level j equals 2j−1
We seek to maximize the total utility at the final level∑2f+1−1
k=2f pkLog(gk + w)
With additional equality constraint∑2f+1−1
k=2f gk = 2
f
And inequality constraint
gk ≥ 0 for k = 2f , 2f + 1, ..., 2f+1 − 1
This is an optimization problem with convex and differentiable objective , affine equality constraint,
and convex inequality constraint. Therefore the KKT conditions [2] are necessary and sufficient to find
an optimum. Let x (with 2f entries) be the solution of this problem (x is the vector of final wealths)
Introducing Lagrange multipliers λ (a vector with 2f entries) for the inequality constraint , and ν (a
scalar), for the equality constraint, we get the standard KKT conditions :
xk ≥ 0,
∑2f
k=1 xk = 2
f , λk ≥ 0, λkxk = 0,
and lastly −pkxk+w − λk + ν = 0 , for k = 1, 2, ..., 2f
Usefully, the above can directly be solved for x. Eliminating λk between the last 2 conditions gives :
(ν − pkxk+w )xk = 0 and
pk
xk+w
≤ ν
Now suppose ν < pkw . Then
pk
xk+w
≤ ν < pkw which can only occur if xk > 0. But then, since
(ν − pkxk+w )xk = 0 we must have ν =
pk
xk+w
, which implies xk = pkν − w
Conversely suppose ν ≥ pkw . But then xk cannot be strictly greater than zero, for if it was,
(ν − pkxk+w )xk is the product of two terms, both strictly greater than 0, and thus cannot be 0.
Therefore we have xk = pkν − w if pkν − w > 0, and 0 otherwise, ie xk = max(0, pkν − w)
Substituting xk into the equality constraint, we have
3
∑2f
k=1 max(0,
pk
ν
− w) = 2f
(3)
The LHS of which is a strictly decreasing continuous function of ν,is zero for large enough ν, and
also arbitrarily large if ν is small enough. By the Intermediate Value Theorem the equation has a unique
solution (which can be readily determined, e.g. by binary search).
Once we have ν, we have x, the vector of optimal final wealths. We then use (2) to get the opti-
mal bets at every node. Interestingly, we see that the value of xk depends only on pk or equivalently the
number of heads in f flips.
This holds in the general case, as is proved shortly, which provides a route to efficient calculation of
the best bet at any point.
4 Example
Following the strategy above for a 4-flip game with p = 0.6, w = 20 would yield the following game tree.
Paths where the player bets all their game wealth and loses are greyed out.
Figure 2: 4-flip game, p = 0.6, w = 20, optimal bets diverge from the Kelly strategy
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5 Analytic solution for more general utility functions
We now consider a general utility function F : R→ R , reasonably be assumed to be continuous, concave
and differentiable. Linear and log utility are special cases of this type. The derivative F ′ need not be
continuous, although it is continuous almost everywhere. F is concave, therefore F ′ is monotonically
decreasing. We therefore know :
F ′(w) ≥ F ′(xk +w). F ′ attains a (not necessarily unique) max at w and a (not neccessarily unique) min
at w + 2f , and if the strict inequality F ′(w) > F ′(xk + w) holds then we must have xk > 0
We now follow exactly the same proof pattern as before,with F (xk + w) and F ′(xk + w)
in place of Log(xk + w) and 1xk)+w
As before we seek to maximize∑2f+1−1
k=2f pkF (gk + w)
subject to the constraints∑2f+1−1
k=2f gk = 2
f and gk ≥ 0 for k = 2f , 2f + 1, ..., 2f+1 − 1
As before, introducing Lagrange multipliers λ (a vector with 2f entries) for the inequality constraint,
and ν ( a scalar) for the equality constraint, we get the standard KKT conditions :
xk ≥ 0,
∑2f
k=1 xk = 2
f , λk ≥ 0, λkxk = 0,
and lastly −pkF ′(xk + w)− λk + ν = 0 , for k = 1, 2, ..., 2f
Eliminating λk between the last 2 conditions gives :
(−pkF ′(xk + w) + ν)xk = 0 and pkF ′(xk + w) ≤ ν
The first term is the product of two nonzero terms. If either is strictly positive, the other is zero.
As before we will use this to determine xk. Define the function H as follows:
H(y) = the largest total wealth z ∈ [−∞, w + 2f ] for which F ′(z) ≥ y
H is decreasing and is roughly the inverse function of the derivative of the utility: given y, H[y] gives a
total wealth ≤ w + 2f where the marginal utility is as close to y as can be without dropping below y.
Figure 3: illustration of F’ and H, where F is capped log utility.
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Now suppose ν < pkF ′(w)
Then pkF ′(xk + w) ≤ ν < pkF ′(w), which can only occur if xk > 0
In this case we can solve for ν and xk :
−pkF ′(xk + w) + ν = 0 ⇒ ν = pkF ′(xk + w) ⇒ xk = H( νpk )− w
Secondly suppose ν > pkF ′(xk + w). Then H( νpk )− w must be < 0
For if not, then there exists some z ≥ w for which pkF ′(z) ≥ ν > pkF ′(w), which cannot be as F ′
is decreasing.
So H( νpk )− w < 0 and consequently −pkF ′(w) < ν. But then
ν − pkF ′(xk + w) ≥ ν − pkF ′(w) > 0 ⇒ xk = 0
Finally suppose pkF’(w) = ν, in which case xk might be zero or positive. Again we set xk = H( νpk )−w
= the largest xk for which F ′(xk + w) = F ′(w) (equality holds as F ′ is decreasing).
In either case, xk satisfies the KKT conditions.
Therefore we have
xk = H(
ν
pk
)− w if H( ν
pk
)− w > 0 and 0 otherwise, i,e xk = max(0, H( νpk )− w)
(4)
Substituting xk into the equality constraint, we have
∑2f
k=1 max(0, H(
ν
pk
)− w) = 2f
(5)
The LHS of which is a decreasing function of ν, and can be efficiently solved for ν , e.g. by binary
search). We note the symmetry between the above expressions and the expressions for the optimal so-
lution for log utility.
Once we have ν, we have x, the vector of optimal final wealths. We then use (2) to get the optimal bets
at every node.
6 Efficient Calculation
There are only f+1 distinct values of pk, namely pf , pf−1(1− p), ..., (1− p)f
We can use the binomial expansion [3] of equation (5)
∑2f
k=1 max(0, H(
ν
pk
)− w) = ∑fj=0( fj
)
max(0, H( ν
pj(1−p)f−j )− w) = 2f
to calculate ν. This conveniently reduces our effort from exponential to linear to calculate x.
Moreover, we can recast our complete binary tree with 2m nodes at level m, into a recombining tree with
m nodes at level m. Specifically, if nodemn is the nth node at level m of the recombining tree, let gmn,
bmn, pmn, be the game wealth at, bet at, and probability of arriving at, nodemn .
?
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Then, by (2) , we have the recurrences
gmn =
g(m+1)n+g(m+1)(n+1)
2
bmn =
g(m+1)n−g(m+1)(n+1
g(m+1)n+g(m+1)(n+1)
(6)
Each level of m nodes takes O(m) effort to calculate. The full set takes effort O(1+2+...+f) = O(f2)
This reduces the effort for the full tree from exponential to quadratic:
Figure 4: Binary and recombining trees
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The expression for the very first bet has a nice form : if x0, x1, ...xf are the distinct values that the
final wealth can take in the recombining tree, the very first bet is
1
2f
f∑
j=0
(
f
j
)
f − 2j
f − j xj
Which may be verified in a variety of ways: induction on f, binomial identities, generating functions. [3]
7 Conclusion
This seems a natural point to pause. This note has generalized the standard Kelly strategy to an optimal
strategy for situations with extraneous wealth, and under a much more general class of reward functions.
The optimal strategy for pathological reward functions e.g. nowhere differentiable, are left as an ex-
ercise to the reader, but are unlikely to occur in reality (one hopes).
Of practical value is the calculation methodology which lets us efficiently derive optimal strategies for
games of many hundreds or thousands of turns. The biased coin metaphor applies not only to long term
investing but any decision process where entities have a notional edge- for example, to help a market
making desk create prices more optimally.
This method might prove of use in more complex games, e.g. the Halite Artificial Intelligence Chal-
lenge at www.halite.io , which shares some key similarities with the coinflipping game.
The note concludes with an anecdote:
A mathematician was asked by their manager to design a chair. They quickly solved the problem of
a chair with zero legs, and with slightly more effort, a chair with infinite legs. A chair with positive
real (though not necessarily integer) legs was conjectured to exist. Finally, one weekend, they solved this
variation as well, although negative legs remains an open problem.
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